Unknown: 0:16

The content of this podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be construed as financial or investment advice. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the hosts and their guests. They do not necessarily reflect the position of any associated employers or organizations. Hello,

Adam Rice: 0:33

everybody. Welcome to Episode 19 of the applied MMT podcast. We have a another special guest joining us today. Rick Boyle is joining. As some of you may have seen his work on Twitter, he's doing some great stuff. And he is definitely MMT adjacent, if not a full on MMT or so. Doug Ryan and I were very impressed his work and we are happy to have him join the podcast today. So thank you, Riddick.

Ritik Goyal: 0:57

Thanks for having me. Yeah,

Adam Rice: 0:59

I think we'd love to start, you know, just would love to hear about your background, maybe your academic background, your professional background. And then if we could go into you know, how you came across MMT? And just kind of what what you're thinking about these days? I think that'd be a great start. Yeah,

Ritik Goyal: 1:14

sure. So, um, well, first of all, thanks for having me. And I really liked the work that y'all are doing on a platinum team, making it kind of like a hub for applying MMT to investing in policy. So it's really cool stuff. But, um, but yeah, I graduated only a few years ago, graduated from Duke studied statistics and computer science. And I think, you know, being kind of young and makes me in a, in a bit of a unique position where, you know, my entire coming of age has been like in the 2010s, where the economy is kind of always been bad. I think that kind of frames, you know, how I think about the relationship between the economy and policy. But um, but after graduating, I worked at Bridgewater for a year had a good time, and learn some things from there. And now I'm working on my own stuff with George Robertson, who I met on Twitter, we have a daily research publication on substack, called the monetary frontier, where we're also thinking about some of these ideas on fiscal and interest rates in the economy.

Adam Rice: 2:15

Awesome. And MMT. Specifically, how did you how did you get into MMT?

Ritik Goyal: 2:22

Yeah, so I think it really was kind of just a little bit of soul searching for like a framework that I think accurately describes, like what's going on in the economy? Because like I said, basically, because, yeah, like my entire kind of development. And like, ever since I've, you know, had a thought about what's going on in the market and economy. It's always been this sort of, like, austerity politics, like the economy is always going through these, like budget cuts. And, and, you know, as early as high school, I think the the narrative that I was told about what's going on throughout the 2010s, in terms of the policy response never really seemed consistent with like, my basic sense of what was happening, which, you know, made me want to search for an explanation. Because the explanation that I was given was always like, oh, policymakers are doing everything that they can do. Either that or like, oh, everything is actually going well. But it's like, you know, why aren't the low rates and like the trillions of dollars of QE working? And I think MMT being like, this descriptive framework that focuses on like, the actual flows of funds that the economy can use and spend is something that just made a lot of sense to me, and that's why I've kind of gravitated towards it.

Adam Rice: 3:29

Awesome. Was it? Was it a specific? Is there a specific book or video or podcast, you can point to the you remember?

Ritik Goyal: 3:36

So I think it's definitely a few things. I think my time at Bridgewater definitely was influential in that, in that respect, I think some of the work they've done and the way that they kind of see things definitely has some alignments with like, the power and the ability of, of fiscal expansion as like a counter cyclical tool. But other than that, I think a lot of like Warren Mosler stuff, also just being like, politically kind of involved and interested, you know, following the work of like, people like Bernie Sanders, and some of like, the political left even, just like, I've kind of picked up bits and pieces from these different spots. Got

Adam Rice: 4:16

it? Cool? And would you say? Would you sit like in terms of, you know, where your, your personal framework now doesn't align entirely with MMT? Do you have disagreements with MMT?

Ritik Goyal: 4:30

Yeah, so I think in terms of like, if I'm ranking all the frameworks against, you know, my, my views MMT is definitely the highest up there. I think, you know, in terms of the, the big kind of innovations of MMT those being like, the idea of like, government crowd out being kind of a myth, and also, like, interest rates being sort of this like term structure of prices. I think those are things that, you know, MMT has, like, given the world and I think those those make a lot of sense. So, in terms of like, disagreements, and obviously like, you know, I don't consider myself like, a pioneer or an expert in MMT or, or even or anything like that, but I think the main area where like, I, you know, have some thoughts is around the idea of like zero kind neutral interest rate, and whether that's a good thing, or whether that's a desirable thing. Like I understand, in theory, the idea that like, you know, money doesn't really deserve to, like pay anything on itself. And then and by that logic, the neutral rate is zero. But at the same time, and I discussed this in my video, the Fed does not exist. I think the key thing that, you know, we have to recognize is that, like, safe assets are vital to the functioning of the system. And when I say safe assets, I mean, like, basically, treasuries, like, those are, you know, say facet number one. And a good indicator for me of is that supply of safe assets plentiful is, is that is the, the price of the asset. And if the interest rate is zero, then the price is high, which suggests that there might be a shortage of those assets. So that's kind of where I think maybe I diverge a little bit. But other than that, I mean, by and large, I really like what I'm MPs to say.

Ryan Benincasa: 6:11

Let's, let's see, so interesting, because, you know, when I was at the levy Institute, you know, summer of 2022, we had, we've kind of had, like, a little bit of a debate about, you know, because that's more of a policy prescription. Right. And, you know, so we had a little bit of a debate about whether, you know, zero interest rates is is, you know, the most desirable policy or, you know, should you have some sort of low fixed nominal the interest rate on, you know, risk free assets or something. You know, it was inconclusive, but it was a, it was a healthy discussion. I think the one of the ironies of MMT, though, is that ostensibly having Mosers point is that having a positive interest rate on government liabilities itself requires government coordination and involvement in the money markets, right. Because if you just, if you just let the Treasury spend and overdraft on its, you know, on its account at the Fed, that's going to add reserves to the system and drive interest rates to zero, so it runs. So it requires, you know, some sort of monetary policy is itself a form of government intervention, which is why I find it so funny when you hear people talking about, oh, you know, we need to let the market you know, set the interest rates and blah, blah, it's like, okay, well, then how about we stop issuing treasuries? Right, right. I mean, is that a form of government influence that you're right?

Ritik Goyal: 8:04

Yeah. So I think that makes sense. For me, like, definitely, if I had to choose between, like this idea of like, letting the market decide the interest rate versus like, having a policy intervention, keep it fixed? I think the the, the, I would lean towards, you know, having it fixed at a certain level, whether that's Euro, whether that's like some low kind of interest rate. I think that like you said, it's more up for debate. But that is that is interesting. The the idea that you can't just let like, the market, like allow this rate to kind of float. Right.

Ryan Benincasa: 8:36

And the other. The other thing is, that's funny, as people, you know, if I ever say something like, you know, the United States Treasury overdraft in its account, the Fed, your people will like gas in horror, right. But then, but the reality is, they're totally okay with commercial banks overdraft or drafting in reserve accounts. Right, which is, it's functionally all like the same thing. Right? That's true. Yeah, so it's just, I, I tend to agree, and, I mean, it's completely arbitrary. But my I mean, you know, my, you know, I think like, a, like a 2%. You know, rate is probably probably, like a, like, a decent, you know, risk free rate that, yeah, that you know, as, as a policy designed, probably make some sense. But that's not to say that that Mosler is wrong is like, like he's got a point. It's just that is the quote unquote, natural rate.

Ritik Goyal: 9:46

I think that so yes, I think one way that I would kind of square it is like, I think there's immense value to having, you know, a fiscal side that can continue to like supply assets to the system. That's kind of like in congruence with the general growth of the economy where the two can kind of grow together. And like, I'm a pretty cynical person when it comes to like the government's like willingness and ability to spend, given like the the realities of political deadlock and all of that. So in a world where you know, I'm unsure if over the next five years, there will be, you know, sufficient kind of public deficits to support the private sector. I think, you know, having rates like you said me 2% 4%, like, having rates that aren't zero is one way to kind of get around that where like, now it's not even in the in the treasuries or it's not even in like the government's hands like they kind of have to spend. And I think we're seeing the effects of that with like this cycle, being able to be extending

Ryan Benincasa: 10:45

towards like a defense mechanism against a kind of idiotic, austere policies, right? Oh,

Unknown: 10:52

really, I'm gonna, I'm gonna, I'm gonna jump in here, take it take a little step back. If you haven't, if you're listening to this, and you haven't looked up Rick's presentation on YouTube, the Fed does not exist. And I think your channel name is just recoil, correct? Yeah, yeah. Okay, find it now. And watch it because it is a fascinating presentation. And I'll tell you, anytime there's a presentation that is that is counterintuitive kind of goes against the grain, but it's very empirically driven. I'm intrigued, and that's exactly what your presentation was. And you had a throwaway line in the middle of it. You effectively said some of the some of the effect of we don't need anything complex like lags and in variability, if the most, if the most simple explanation, or the most straightforward explanation gives us what we need, we should probably go with that. And and that absolutely sunk in to me, and I feel like at least is, you know, what I kind of call the MMT framework, whatever you want to call it, I mean, the fact that our economy is just one big circuit of one person handing off money to the next person, right? The, the policy decisions are just how that might happen. And when that might happen, no matter how you slice it, if it fits in that simple, explanatory framework, then we should probably just go with that. So that was great. But it's it's an hour long, masterclass, or 5050, some odd minute masterclass of how to look at markets, or really how to look at an aspect of kind of market landscape and in a way that in a way that I know, I have never explored it. And to give the listener just a little a little more understanding. If you've watched anything I put out, you know, I am a trader, first and foremost, I care about only am I going to, you know, what's my return going to be in the next week, next month, next year. But the vast majority of the investing landscape is asset allocation in it is not necessarily thinking about the largest return in the future, but the risk adjusted return and there are a lot of other variables. And that's the look that you have. So with that jumping off point, can you give us the 62nd, two minute, however long you need to take any kind of argument that you're making in that video, with the conclusion ultimately been a very similar conclusion that that, you know, I've come to from, from my direction, a direction, which is higher rates, ultimately, we're going to be stimulative. And higher rates ended up being stimulative. And, again, you give a completely fresh look at it. That corresponds very similar to the look that I had. So I'll hand it off to you. Yeah, sure.

Ritik Goyal: 13:20

Thanks, man. appreciate the kind words about the video, I think, yeah, it's a, it's an interesting kind of way that I think about things and I want to say like, whenever MMT people watch the video, they're like, Yeah, you know, it's cool, you know, nothing crazy. But then when non MMT. People watch it, it's like always super polarizing. And like, I don't know, if like, I like what I'm saying kind of thing. So it's good to talk to people that have kind of a similar framework. But so the key idea of the presentation is basically trying to like transfer the power of policy from the Fed to fiscal and revealing the Fed to not be much more than like, basically just like a clearing system that can't really affect economic outcomes, because it can't change how much money is in the system, or is circulating in the system, like, you know, fiscal can. Where rate policy, you know, QE, these things don't really work in the way that the Fed, you know, likes to think it does they do, or that the Fed kind of needs the system to think that they do. And on the empirical question of like, you know, like you said, with all these like, like, you know, lags and those types of things. The idea is like, what we see is that when rates are high, inflation tends to be high, historically, that's true. And then when rates are low, inflation and nominal growth tend to be low. And historically, that's also true. So if our starting point, though, is, you know, low rates stimulate the economy, low rates mean, inflation is going to be high, and then higher rates are restrictive on the economy. And high rates mean, you know, the economy is going to go into recession. The evidence doesn't bear that out. The evidence says the exact opposite. And so the question is, like, is the mechanics right is the empirical evidence right? And the idea with the video is like, the mechanics and the evidence actually work together, where there actually is a mechanical explanation for why higher rates cause inflation to rise and lower rates cause inflation to fall and the reason for that is it goes back to the idea of safe assets are what undergird the system, meaning that when interest rates are high, that's an indication that the supply of safe assets is high. So you know, when the fiscal side is expanding its deficit, typically, as that, as that supply makes its way into the system, interest rates, you know, on on safe liabilities, like, you know, government liabilities tend to rise. And that's inflationary, because those safe assets now have a place in the economy that the the kind of private sector can, can latch on to. So I make this argument about diversification, where the way to kind of convinced the system to produce risky assets and to go take risk, yes, go take no risk is not, you know, let's read the system of all the treasuries and let's read the system of the safe assets, such that now everybody is like kicked into risky assets. The way to do that is actually the exact opposite, which is the safe assets represent insurance for the system. And in order to get people to take risk, you have to add insurance to the system. So in you know, halfway through the video, I compare this to what's going on in Florida with with home insurance prices, where home insurance prices are rising right now, because of you know, the climate change related stuff and those kind of natural disasters. And what you're not seeing is people like selling off their home insurance, and then going and buying more Florida, Florida houses, you're seeing the opposite, which is, home insurance is too expensive. So let's leave the state, let's sell our house, let's go somewhere else, where we don't have to pay such high prices for our uninsurance. And when you take that to the economy, insurance is just treasuries Treasuries are the insurance of the system. And when the price of treasuries gets too high, and treasuries get too scarce, it becomes difficult to take risk, because now you're not really hedged. So that's the idea. And that kind of goes with the MMT idea that like the idea of crowd out, where if the government spends too much, then the private sector won't take its own risk that can empirically you know, that's not that's not the case. And I think mechanically, it's not the case, where it's the opposite, that when the government spends it, you know, adds equity to the private sector that makes first taking for the private sector, pretty easy. And I think I walk through a little bit of the history of how that's happened in like periods, like the 70s. And how it didn't happen in the 2010s. That's the main idea behind the video is that, you know, the system needs safe assets. And when the Fed cuts rates, and when it does QE, this, the Fed rids the system of those safe assets, and the ultimate outcome is is a very lackluster private sector.

Unknown: 17:42

So So essentially, when the Fed increases interest rates, they are given a good protective put to the protective put. And it allows things to be more risky. And in a sense of a growing economy, we want risk, because that's going to ultimately find the innovation, find the growth, find the stuff that sticks, when there is no risk, there's no one's gonna No one's gonna find the new next best thing. And because we're only going to stick with the things that you that work, which is why you grew up, at least came came to where you're at today. And in the last 1015 years of, of just reinventing the iPhone every year is the exact same thing is that

Ritik Goyal: 18:24

that's that's the innovation that I got. Yeah, kind of disappointing, honestly.

Unknown: 18:28

Yeah. Yeah. That is, I mean, if you haven't watched it, make sure you check it out, I'll tell you, right, about halfway through is where it all clicked, he had this little, this little flow chart that showed, you know, what the Fed thinks they're doing with the safe and risky being 2080. But in fact that the safe and risky go together, they moved together. And I thought that was such a great approach. If you don't mind me asking one more question, Ryan Adams, if you guys want to cut me off before I asked this, but you had said you worked at Bridgewater and at least my understanding would be the mean stream would not accept, they would not accept what you're trying to trying to sell would not want to bite on what you're trying to sell in the financial world, at least into the audience that you've had, how, how palatable was what was was your your pitch and, and what what was the what was the response? So

Ritik Goyal: 19:25

I think, when when think about like kind of how how Bridgewater thinks about the economy and process the economy, there are certain kinds of alignments with like I said, you know, fiscal being a force that actually does have the ability to produce inflation, unlike anything the Fed is really unable to do. So the way that Bridgewater is kind of like framed the evolution of policy is this thing of like MP one and P two and mp three were MPs on monetary policy. And so the first approach that policymakers used was handling the short term interest rates, that's MP one. And then MP two was when the interest rates at the zero lower bound. The next thing on the table was QE, which, you know, launched in like the 2010s and had in my opinion, not only wasn't not only unsuccessful, but counter counterproductive and then mp3 He is basically the merging of the Fed and the fiscal side where QE has also lost its utility. So now the only thing that policymakers can do to stimulate is, is is fiscal expansion. And so from that sense, you know, and then and Bridgewater process, it's kind of how the fiscal spending of, you know, the COVID stimulus would affect the economy and affect asset markets pretty well. But I think the way that I think about it is like, we've always been in an mp3 world, the world has always been dominated by fiscal like, just because the Fed is the one that's doing the things. And then when those things stop working, the Fed does other things, doesn't mean that the way that the system works is it's the fiscal side, that's the only real counter cyclical tool that policymakers have. And so, you know, that goes all the way back to Volcker. And I get into this a little bit in the video where the Volcker recessions of you know, the early 1980s weren't a function of, you know, Volcker hiking rates a lot. And then that causing the recession, like, there's just really no evidence of that. And I've really, like, I spent a lot of time and this is what I do for fun is like reading fed transcripts from the 1970s, where there's no indication that like, we're going to cause recession tomorrow, or like, we're gonna keep rates high enough to cause a recession. It's always just the Fed, like, reacting to the fact that Oh, rates went up. Okay, I guess that means that, you know, actually, the economy is strong, oh, it's 1982 rates are going down, I guess the economy is weak, there's never a direct linkage between the Fed doing something and that causing kind of like a very predictable outcome. These are complex systems. And I think, you know, Warren talks about this better than anybody, like the real culprits of those recessions were, you know, the fiscal, like, the fiscal relationship to the economy, where, you know, everybody was making more nominal income tax, you know, the tax brackets weren't changing. So everybody got richer, the tax burden, you know, the the tax burden of the private sector went up, that caused, you know, kind of fiscal surplus. And then also, there was a real fiscal surplus in the sense of like, the, the fiscal expansion wasn't growing at the rate that inflation was. And those are the things that you can like, clearly see happening in the late 70s, and then producing the early recession of the 80s. And to me, that tells me that like, it's always just been a question of fiscal, it's always been this like mp3 world, and the Fed, you know, doesn't really have the tools that it thinks it does, or that it needs us to think it does. And in that world, it becomes a lot of like, signaling, psychology sentiment, those are the things that the Fed is able to manipulate. And they were able to do that kind of successfully for for 2030 years after 1980. But then in 2010, that system failed, and they had to try something else. And then that failed. And then that's where we are right now. And that's, that's kind of the way that I was thinking about things. Some of the ideas, some of those ideas have developed since I left Bridgewater because I, you know, had a little bit more freedom to, to think about the economy in the way that I guess I wanted to, but that's, I think the the kind of main divergence that I would have with them.

Ryan Benincasa: 23:17

That's interesting, because, yeah, I remember, I think, like, a couple years ago, listening to Ray Dalio, probably on a podcast or something, you know, get asked about MMT. And he kind of says, like, oh, yeah, I know, MMT. MMT is basically what we call mp3 and laid out exactly as you as you described, where it's like, you know, comes in these stages. And I remember being a little disappointed in that answer. Because the point that MMT, as, as I've always understood it, is that kind of what you're saying, like, it's not like this trial and error type of thing where you go through these different stages and P one and P two, it's like, no, this is the standard operating procedure of how sovereign currency systems function, right and have always functioned. So that's that I remember thinking like that, that was a pretty weak answer, because it kind of sounds like he didn't really or perhaps hadn't hadn't given a, you know, a proper look at what MMT was saying and, and how it it perhaps, you know, differentiate from their their envy three.

Ritik Goyal: 24:39

And one other thing I add to the the mp3 conversation is the way that I think, you know, Dalio would describe it as like mp3 resent represents the coordination of central banks and the fiscal authority where, you know, the fiscal, the fiscal side wants to spend a lot and the only way to make that happen is like, the central bank buys all the debts and all the debt and keeps interest rates at zero to facilitate that. And there's there's not really you know, good evidence that like that needs to happen itself. Either where, like, like MMT says, like the fiscal side can just can spend on its own without you know, significant inter pension from the central bank. And I make the argument in the video that when the central bank actually keeps rates at zero and like buys all the assets that the the Treasury is issuing that itself is counterproductive because like I said, like the system needs those assets. Because those are as as Douglas, you said those are the put for the system. So to me, the real coordination would be fed you get out of the way, recognize that, like, what you do doesn't really like help us nice, any real sense. And then fiscal, you you do the spending that the system needs. But that's that's just another another point. Well,

Ryan Benincasa: 25:49

to further kind of support that point, too. And I don't remember if we've talked about this on this show, or I mean, I know I wrote about it a little bit. Maybe I talked about on Douglass MPG stream, I can't remember. But I had this, this line that like the US government actually doesn't have enough debt. And the existence of the of the RP of the overnight RP at$2 trillion. is evidence of that for sure. Because it's literally the Fed re issuing treasuries that you know, that the private sector demands or what have you, you know, because they other because the agents that are buying, or that are, excuse me participating in the Feds overnight reverse repo program, essentially, they have reserve accounts at the Fed, but they are precluded from receiving interest on, you know, on on the reserves, essentially, because of the way I guess, the role the law was written?

Ritik Goyal: 26:54

Absolutely, there's, there's all there's all sorts of evidence that, you know, this this safe collateral that the system needs is in short supply, structurally. So, the RP, like you said, is a great example of that where like, these players are all like, desperately searching for for essentially T bills, or Tebow substitutes. And they're, you know, and the buildup, the RP is an example of that. And that's why I think, you know, the, the issuance of bills that has come in the last few months has been has been, you know, pretty great. Another one is, when you think about like T bill rates versus like the reverse REPO rate, or like the short term like Fed funds rate, a lot of times T bill rates will be under all of those, like policy fed administered rates. And again, that's just another example of like, there's a, there's a shortage of collateral, people want t bills, because peoples are, you know, have a special place in the economy as one of those safe assets. You know, when the yield curve, you know, gets gets deeply inverted as it does sometimes that's another example of a collateral shortage. So there's all sorts of evidence that, like you said, there's just not enough treasuries in the system. So, you know, I'm hopeful that the Fed kind of gets out of the way and stops doing their QE as their form of stimulus. But I'm not that

Ryan Benincasa: 28:05

optimistic holding my breath. While we think about the market kind of movements the last few days, I'm curious to hear, Douglas, I know, You've been a little under the weather. But it's been a little bit of Rip City here, at least in the in the equities, and high yield markets. So I have a couple of ideas. But I'm curious to hear others other thoughts first.

Ritik Goyal: 28:39

So for, I guess, for on my side, I think. And one thing that kind of George and I talk about a lot is that this market will be like, dominated by like overshoots, in both directions, where you'll see like a rip higher to like 5%, on the 10 year, and then and then it'll come all the way back down. But ultimately, I think, if I zoom out a little bit, the the main story has been, there's been a constant battle between on inequities between the idea that like, growth was slow enough, there's going to be a recession, etc. And that'll be, you know, negative for the equity market, with the data just keeps coming in that that recession just keeps having to get pushed further and further back. And so this actually, thing that I've been thinking a little bit about is that when equity started to decline in early 2022, as the feds, you know, began its rate hike campaign, if we like, determine what's behind that equity decline, like the conventional explanation is like the discount rates rising. And you know, the present value of all cash flows falls to stocks fall. But to me, it seems more and more like what was getting priced in in early 2022 wasn't some sort of like discount rate, really mechanism, it was just that equities were pricing and that the Fed would cause recession. And that pricing, and that story turned out to not be the case, which I think is just, you know, an example of like misunderstanding what the effects of the Feds rate hikes really are. And I think, you know, MMT folks did a good job. Understanding that what was getting priced in you know, wasn't was unlikely to be the reality and then have kind of enjoyed the the benefit So that in like the last year or so?

Adam Rice: 30:20

Yeah, I think, you know, going, going back to the Volcker thing, it's gonna be interesting to see I mean, if you know if we don't get a recession, because there's now going to be two data points in people's minds between Volcker and this most recent episode of inflation, where the Fed raised rates and inflation ended up slowing, and everyone is still gonna attribute the inflation, you know, the slowing of inflation to the, to the rate hikes, right? In both cases. Yep. One time we got a recession. The second time, we haven't had a recession, at least not yet. And it's unfortunate, because that's still what the mainstream is going to point to when it comes to, you know, what needs to be done in order to combat these inflationary episodes. And I wonder if the thinking will change at all, if we don't get a recession, which it doesn't seem like we will. That's

Ritik Goyal: 31:08

interesting. So and that's, you know, one of the things that, you know, I try to keep in mind when I'm thinking about the economy is like, we only get to run this experiment once at any given moment. And it's it is, like you said, kind of unfortunate that we happen to be having rate hikes for last, you know, 18 months or whatever. And we happen to have been having a kind of disinflationary trend for the last year. And just because those things are happening on top of each other doesn't mean they're causing each other in any given way. Where, you know, the counterfactual could very well be that if rates were kept at zero throughout that inflation would be 0% right now. So it's, it's difficult to make those make those claims in a messy kind of subject like economics, which is why, you know, I think focusing on the mechanics is very important. And I'm, you know, of the belief that if rates were held low that, you know, inflation right now would potentially be even lower, but we'll have to see about the recession as well.

Unknown: 32:07

Read it your your second video on your YouTube channel, also very, very well worth a watch. And I just pulled it up, we're inflation comes from you discuss a little bit of this topic of inflation. And it was it was quite timely in terms of where we're at with the Fed, potentially pivoting. And it's something again, that, you know, putting MMT you know, kind of Mosler language aligns very well, which is this idea that you can have a one off price adjustment that, that, as an observer in the economy, we would also call inflation, right? If the government prints out trillions of dollars one time and hands it out, we will see that as CPI increasing, and then when you measure inflation is the rate of change of CPI, you're gonna have inflation, but that's a one off change. And then you're back to whatever the policy rate is, or wherever inflation is converging at whatever policy rate is dictating that, but then you and I love this. I mean, this is I'm going to your idea of the spectrum is such a great idea that as you move along the spectrum, eventually inflation does become reinforced, it does become what we call what, when people say inflation, what they mean is this constant, increasing and increasing of the rate of increase of the cost of goods and services throughout the throughout the economy. I will shut up for a second, if you want to kind of drive home any points that I'm leaving out on that. And then I'll get to my you know, my next point question. So yeah, drive that point home? Sure. Yeah, I

Ritik Goyal: 33:34

think and thanks for shouting it out. The The main point is, that it's kind of to go back to the the Friedman, quote of like inflation is everywhere, and always a monetary phenomenon, and really like working through the mechanics of is that true? And why is it true. And the reality is, the only way and that's the point I'm making the video is the only way to get a self sustaining impulse of inflation, is to have a self sustaining impulse of money, there's really no other way because otherwise, every inflation will necessarily be self correcting. Because we have these two ideas that tend to be in competition with each other. The first is like higher prices, care, higher prices. So you think you hear this a lot with like commodities, where like, if the price of oil doubles, then like, people will slow their demand, and then the price of oil will fall. And then the other side is like higher prices cause higher prices were like, there's this inflationary psychology and then everybody thinks prices can keep rising, and then everybody's income keeps rising, so then prices can keep rising. And so the video is like trying to work out, you know, which of those is true, and under what circumstances is one of them true. And the conclusion that I come to is the only way to get a self sustained. Inflation is for the supply of money to keep expanding. And so what we got with the beginning of COVID, with these fiscal programs was a few of these like adrenaline shots of fiscal spending into the economy, which were very, you know, necessary and vital, but those are only transitory programs, which means that they only produce a transitory inflation. And, you know, until the end of 2021, interest rates were at zero, the fiscal side was like coming kind of coming off. And, you know, the private sector hadn't really taken the taking the wheel in terms of, you know, private credit creation. So the inflation was, you know, very clearly in my view, transitory Lori up until then, and that's what bond markets, you know, said, you know, bond markets showed as well, where inflation expectations remain very anchored. And then the Fed started raising rates and, you know, forced another round of fiscal spending into the economy. And now, you know, with rates, you know, high, you know, we're kind of uncertain where they're gonna go, they could stay high. Now, I think the risk of a kind of self reinforcing inflation is much higher, because the debt has to get funded. And you know, the federal government is going to have to spend money to fund it.

Unknown: 35:49

Well, yeah, you answered the second question, or one of the next follow up questions, I think, right there. The Fed came out earlier this week, I guess Ryan said, I was I was watching this half, half, half aware of what was actually going on during the week, just laid up in bed. But it does seem like the Fed is coming out and saying they're gonna cut rates at least three times next year. Yeah, my bed. I don't bet on treasuries. I don't. I mean, I play stocks, because that's where I think the data is the best, at least for for my strategy. But if I was a betting man, I think ultimately, the Fed is, rates will ultimately be higher, at the end of 2024, than where they are right now. I'm basing that on the fact that one, this will only stay true if in fact, still behind closed doors, the Fed actually thinks that raising rates will decrease inflation, if they still have that mechanism in place that thought process in place, I think we're gonna get the second wave of inflation starting to show up probably already right now. It'll just start to be very apparent in the data, and therefore, the Fed will not be able to go through with a rate cuts. That's my take. Do you think I'll just put it this way? Do you think rates will be higher and lower December 2024, than they are right now, based on the way you're seeing it? And then we'll also act on the assumption that the Fed doesn't just decide to change their, you know, their model for policy, which they could, right? I mean, they're not going to, but they could be like, Hey, we listen to that podcast with Riddick and Doug, and Adam and Ryan. And I'm just convinced now.

Ritik Goyal: 37:19

Yeah, we can only wish so so I think I'm with you that, you know, if we think about the mechanics, the mechanics point towards the Feds current paradigm for interest rates, being, you know, further stimulating, that, you know, producing a skew, I think towards either, you know, higher inflation, or at least inflation higher than the 2% target, they feel like, you know, their mandate, their credibility rests on bringing inflation to 2%. And until that job is done, rates have to stay in what they deem restrictive, which means, you know, not cutting when the market thinks they're going to cut or, you know, keeping rates at at these levels around like 505 50. So, that's, that's where I think I would, I would end up which means that you know, relative to what's priced in, I think rates will, will be a little bit higher. But what does worry me and I like to think about this in terms of, like, you're standing on like, a, like a ball or something. And like, as soon as you lose your balance, it's very, it's basically a very fragile balance. And as soon as you lose that balance, you can tip one way. So what we've gotten in the last few days is like, there's always been some cuts priced into markets, the Fed moved, that pricing of cuts a little bit forward, where now, you know, like you said, 75 basis points are priced in of cuts, that in our framework, and the way we think about things is those that those cuts are depressive for the economy. And, you know, if if that, you know, little bit of, you know, a few billion dollars, or whatever of fiscal spending, you know, doesn't make it because those cuts have gotten priced in and the debt burden has come down. And that means there's a little bit less spending that goes on, which means that, you know, data comes out a little bit softer than than what it should have, if rates were a little bit higher. And then that little bit softer data means the Fed, you know, under the way it thinks about things, the Feds like, okay, you know, the things are coming down, inflation looks like it's around 2%, they say, okay, you know, we can cut a little bit more, you know, so now it's like 125 basis points are cutting are priced in, that's even more depressive, and that snowball starts getting rolling in that direction, in the kind of left tail direction. That is, I think, the big risk where all of a sudden, you know, the market and the Federal reinforcing each other and you're sitting at, like, 2% rates in in, you know, six months. That is a risk, I think, yeah,

Adam Rice: 39:29

that's, that's, I think I brought this up on our last podcast, because I've been I've been thinking the same thing. It's like, you know, what if, what if they begin to cut and the economy slows down as a result, and in trying to get the economy going, again, they continue to cut, right? And they're just reinforcing? Or it could be just, you know, something exogenous happens. Sure, and they cut as a result, and remove all that fiscal support, which I think you know, this I think these are very real possibilities, which is kind of scary.

Ritik Goyal: 39:56

I think that's the biggest that's the biggest risk to me is taking out that that support to the economy.

Adam Rice: 40:02

But I guess, you know, the question is, what the question is what what you know, is the deficit like outside of the the interest payments is the debt is the deficit high enough to to kind of mitigate the effects of lowering rates. So

Ritik Goyal: 40:21

I think there's, there's a couple of pieces, I think, yeah, if you, if you remove the the interest, the interest burden, and you know, we can have all sorts of discussions about like, is that money the most, most quickly spent in the economy and all that, versus some of the other programs, I think that the level of the fiscal deficit still is, is in what I would consider an ease, especially with some of these like, kind of inflation adjustments to various programs, meaning that the starting level for the spending will be higher. And then on top of that, and there's some of the work that I've done with George, when we think about the the rounds of stimulus, in response to COVID, a lot of that savings actually still does exist in the economy. So there is a little bit of a, like a nest egg that the that, you know, consumers do have the ability to keep spending, but at the same time, like, I think, you know, the the rate of change, and like the the first second derivative, those things can't be ignored. Where, even though there is, you know, a base of funds that can still be spent, and the fiscal deficit still is, you know, relatively loose, if the rate of change ends up being less than people expected, then that I think, does have a behavioral impact and means that like, even with a quote unquote, like easy fat or easy, you know, fiscal side, people can can spend as if, you know, they realize that the, the fiscal side won't be coming to the rescue anytime soon. And I think that, that, that psychology, honestly, like, is, is very real. I know that like, when I'm talking to, like, my parents about like, their, their finances, and they're like, oh, like, rates are down to 4%. Like, that does not seem as great as it was three months ago, and they're at 5%. Like, I could get 5% of my money now. It's, it's only like four and a half percent like, man, that's, that's, that's, like, we missed opportunity like that, that's psychology like, absolutely makes it into to like how people, I guess with money, think about their money. So so up to see, I think, I think you can't ignore, like the the rate of change component as well.

Ryan Benincasa: 42:15

So I think that's a very, I'm so glad you brought that up, because I think that's a very, very important and very relevant point, and topical with what's going on right now. Because, you know, again, people, you know, who have savings, and they've been enjoying this this sort of newfound windfall in the form of short term, you know, you buy T bills and clip 5% or whatever. And, you know, maybe you bought six months T bills a few months ago, and, you know, those are rolling off in, in a few months. And the market right now is pricing in some rate cuts. So yeah, so if it goes from five to four, so I do think that there is something to be said, for within like a, you know, a within a fixed pool of, of assets. Right, and understanding that, you know, there's constant inflows and outflows, but if we just think about sort of the average pool of assets, size, whatever, there is going to be some sort of like zero some rebalancing between you know, stocks and bonds within that, and, and even like, you know, higher, you know, higher quality, you know, credit risk free assets versus low, lower credit quality, high higher risk assets. Sure. And so, you know, there is a, like the idea of a so called Reach for yield. Dynamic, like, to an extent, is true, and we've seen that over the last few days, we've seen, you know, corporate credits, absolutely, rally, like across the board, and, you know, as, as, you know, a company's bonds rally, right, especially if you're a high yield issuer, that's going to be ultimately positive for the stock, right, because your, your cost of funds is, is going down, which is, you know, ultimately a benefit for the owner of, of that, of that business. So, I think, you know, you know, in the most nuanced way possible, like the expected rate cuts, yeah, probably negative for the economy. You know, in the interim, it supports asset prices and, and, and perhaps creates a rebalancing effect, but I also think, I mean, what we've seen the last few days, at least in some in some of the names that I traffic and one that is like, it's been, like panic buying as the only way to really describe it, and I think, to an to an extent, you know, that's really almost almost like market parts. dispense anticipating the sort of rebalancing, that's that that they think is going to come. Because if the Fed cuts rates, then, you know, people are going to be, you know, perhaps rebalancing their portfolios out of treasuries and into high yield credit or, or, you know, more into equities, especially, you know, if you if you have like a 6040 or whatever, and the bonds rally, then then, you know, you've got to rebalance the portfolio to get back into that, that sort of balance. And, and I think a lot of the stock market participants know that and understand that and are basically trying to not front run that's got like a, like a bad connotation to it, but they're trying to, like they're panic buying the shares, you know, before they go up too much, essentially, before the big institutional pools of capital are going to inevitably sort of flow in. And that's, that's sort of my take on this sort of violent move upwards that we've seen the last couple days. So maybe there's a maybe Douglas has some sort of weird options up next thing that that I don't know or understand. But yeah,

Ritik Goyal: 46:37

I mean, I'll just quickly say, like, I'm no expert on on the flow side of things. I mean, like the mechanics and like, logically, the rebalancing channel, like it makes a lot of sense. But when I think about, like, the relationship between those kinds of flows into into the stock market, or into like, kind of risk assets, and its effect on on the economy, I think there's, there's just no way that like, that rebalancing is nearly as stimulative as, as receiving payments and kind of like a more fixed like, you know, yearly or like on a frequency basis receiving payments that that can be spent. And so there's this idea of the permanent income hypothesis, which is basically that like, people generally spend as a function of their best guests expectations for their, like annual income over a long period of time. And the implication of that is that when asset prices rise from these kind of like, I would say transitory or like kind of, you know, unintended anticipated factors, basically, when asset prices rise for any reason, other than the cash flows of the assets aren't rising, those rising asset prices are deemed I think, correctly by by market participants is kind of transitory or kind of unsustainable. And so, you know, my my equity prices, my stock portfolio has doubled. For whatever reason, I don't really know why, I guess it's some sort of Santa rally, my stocks have gone up a lot, that doesn't really affect, you know, how I how I carry out my business and whether I spend or not. So I think, you know, when these when these cuts start to get priced in and people will kind of move out into like, corporate credit, and then they move out into stocks. I think it absolutely is bullish for stocks. And I think there's a good argument that the kind of broad asset rally that we've seen the last couple of weeks is is that dynamic playing out. But I still think that like the ultimate outcome of those portfolio, rebalancing, the price and cuts is still I think negative for the economy. Because inflating equity prices, doesn't do the same thing for the economy, as you know, flooding the system with safe assets. And you know, that that flood of safe assets does deflate some substitutes to those safe assets, like corporate bonds or stocks. But those that's all part and parcel of, you know, achieving, like a world where like, all assets are highly cash flowing, and then that's kind of like a pretty stimulative inflationary thing for the economy. So I think I wouldn't really I personally wouldn't count on on those rebalancing effects as like being stimuli for the economy, where like, ultimately if if the Fed, you know, keeps cutting, and we see these, these sharp rallies in risk assets, I think, ultimately, like when on the other side of the tunnel, when when we get a recession, because the rates have gone down too quickly. That'll we'll feel that in stocks eventually.

Ryan Benincasa: 49:19

Yeah, that totally agreed, I think the what's called the wealth effect or whatever. It's totally, totally overrated.

Ritik Goyal: 49:26

I agree. Definitely.

Unknown: 49:28

I really liked your analogy of the person balancing on the ball, and that we're right at that point where maybe we're starting to maybe we're starting to wobble just a little bit. And it's really hard when people ask you about your opinion of what's going to happen in the future. And you have to say, well, there's the potential that we go into a crippling recession or markets could be up, you know, 20% by the end of 2024. Those are the two options we have but it sounds like pretty much the what's going to really be where things go one way or another is really at the Fed thinks that inflation and growth is just too hot too soon, and they decide not to they decide not to do any rate cuts. I mean, is that a simple way of putting it if if wave two inflation hits then we probably are going to see a very hot 2024 If not Then we could see this spiraling down effect of rates, depressing, depressing growth, depressing rates, is that a fair way of summarizing?

Ritik Goyal: 50:25

Absolutely. And the kind of unfortunate thing is like, we would want the Fed to be this counter cyclical actor that does the opposite of what the market thinks. We're in this world where the Fed is procyclical. And it the Fed is like, you know, it's working with the private sector. And that's why the, you know, the economy, the economy is always so like binary, and so like bimodal. And it's because you don't have anybody other than really the fiscal side that's doing the opposite of what everybody else is doing. So if the Fed plus the private sector is always working in the same direction together, then yes, you either follow the left side of the ball or the right side of the ball. And those are the two kind of outcomes.

Unknown: 50:59

And in my debates with people who think the yield curve, inversion is the greatest predictor of markets, I've tried to explain this so many times that no, it's just the Fed doing, what the market is already doing. And then reinforcing, like, like the worst outcome for the market. Yeah, that's great. I got to ask you, we're gonna have to geek out for a second. Sorry, listeners, you mentioned first and second derivatives being so important, we can't, we can't forget those. One of the charts that just absolutely intrigued me was your change the one year yield and change in the bank lending. And, like, I don't even have to run any, any causal analysis or anything like that, to see that. One is clearly leading the other here. It looks so reinforcing as well. I mean, it looks like the minute you start getting the deceleration, in the change of the one year yield, it's inevitable that you're going to see a contraction in bank lending that leads to a that leads to a recession now, kind of you kind of spelled out the mechanical ways in which you think this will play out earlier. You know, help me understand this a little more, help me understand your own intuition here. In terms of if the Fed decides to cut. This has been my big worry if the Fed does decide to cut? Is there anything that can offset that? Or will the Will it play out the way they used to explain 510 minutes ago, that depressing growth and then growth, then that depression of growth showing up in March, just a deceleration of growth showing up in the data and then the Fed decides to cut more and then it's a it's a cycle down? Is that you know, from from your, from your instinct, is that pretty much an inevitability does that first cut shock enough through the system? Where the Fed immediately picks up on that? Or is there something else? Is there? Is there another hope? Or are we stuck with with the one alternative of this is just playing out?

Ritik Goyal: 52:55

Well, I will say is there's literally never been a period in history where the economy has been by any standard good and rates have been at zero. And so, you know, when when we end up in this in this kind of self reinforcing direction, where the Fed feels compelled to, like, do whatever it has to do, and bring Race to Zero as part of that. You know, in my study of history, there's just been never really a case of of that working out. And in the 2010s, you know, the Fed toyed with a rate hike in, in like 2015 2016. And that was, that happened to be one, you saw the first kind of pickup and credit growth through this, like huge deleveraging, we saw in 2010 2008. And so on the point of the relationship between the the risk free rate and bank lending, so the chart that you referring to, and it's it's in the video is that the price of risk free credits, like the one year Treasury yield, or two year Treasury Fed funds, or whatever the price of a risk free asset, or the rate of risky asset is actually positively correlated with the rate of bank lending. So you would think, Oh, when rates are high, like nobody wants to borrow, so like, lending should be low and borrowing should be low, and then the river and vice versa. And it's actually the opposite, where as rates are rising, you know, bank lending is also rising. And so again, it's very easy to be like, oh, you know, long, long and variable lags. So like, actually, when, when the Fed, you know, raised rates, you know, six years ago, that's why, you know, rates are, that's why like lending is, is is down now, like, it's very easy to say that, you know, long and variable lags, we can hide behind that, and you know, what the Fed is doing actually is working the way they want. But when I think about the mechanics, I think one thing that, you know, our household and business kind of view, sometimes models is that, like, you know, credit is is like any other market where there's a buyer and a seller, and when rates are too low, you stop getting sellers of that credit, you stop getting lenders, and so, you know, when rates are at zero, banks don't want to lend for many reasons. You know, first of all, like the rate that they think they can earn on that on that credit is very low. So it's not worth the risk of a default, which tends to be very high. And then also when rates are too low, like I said, you know, banks don't really have any good forms of insurance so they can, you know, add a huge credit spread onto onto the onto the loan that they're making, but Then no borrower wants to make that loan at that credit spread. And then also when rates are at zero, having a high credit spread means that like, for risky borrowers, the rate isn't even actually isn't actually zero anyways. So I think the correlation is is very strong, where when when, when rates are rising, bank lending is rising, and you know, when, and that's, you know, that's great for the economy. And then the reverse is also true. And there's actually a causal link, it's not just like, oh, it happens to be this way. And I work through the causal mechanics of that in the video.

Unknown: 55:48

Let me preaching to the choir there. Yeah. Great stuff. Let me leave the tango, let me let me linger on this point for just a second. And then I'll get off the geek stuff. But you had said, I don't know if we mentioned this in the podcast. But I know, beforehand, you had said you do have a degree in computer science and statistical analysis, I have a I have a lot of fun doing a lot of causal analysis, you know, machine learning is, over the last 10 years has made causal analysis much more much more feasible, and especially in complex systems, like the economy, have you pressed in any of the causal analysis stuff, if you play with causal link, it's causal. Mm, and then there's causal pi, have you done anything to Granger cause? Or cross convergence? Or any of the graph map stuff? Any, any anything like that? And then if you haven't, you do even find any that is a worthwhile endeavor in the first place? Or does it seem like you know, the economy's just gonna be too complex to really have any, any payoff there?

Ritik Goyal: 56:49

I think I definitely, I definitely kind of lean towards the, the step one in any process is like, is your mental map for how the economy works is that sound, because the amount of noise with with all these factors, like hitting each other will, will always create a lot of messiness. And as long as like, your linkages for how you think the economy plays out. Make sense? And you can defend them. Like, that's, that's the biggest thing. So personally, like, and then, you know, I, I'm much more like, I love reading, like, the history and reading these transcripts and thinking about it from that perspective. So I haven't spent that much time think going from like, the the kind of like, causal inference approach, but, you know, I've read some of the stuff that you've done Douglas and, and, you know, there's, there's just great success behind it. So I think, if there's anybody that can, that can, you know, push me to that to that other side and like, open up the tool chest about some of the MLS stuff, then I think it's you and I'm and I would be on board.

Unknown: 57:50

Right on? Well, I if, you know, I have a lot of projects that never make it to Twitter, because they just they don't feel polished enough, you know, and, and, and I don't know if I trust the outcome or not, but I'll make sure if I come up with anything interesting, I'll toss you the, the Jupyter notebook, and you can have a look. Thanks.

Ryan Benincasa: 58:14

Um, so I have one sort of idea Cosmos, maybe we could finish off with this. I just want to kind of throw this out there. Right. It's something I've been been thinking on. And it just kind of get people's thoughts on, you know, whether this is a useful and or accurate sort of framework or analogy to think about deficits and inflation. So, um, so All right. You know, Stephanie Kelton had in the deficit myth had that great analogy about, you know, the Fed or the US government as really the Fed being as like a scorekeeper in a in a ballgame, right? You know, they just mark up, you know, someone scores a goal or a run or a basket and scorekeeper just marks up the count. They don't have to mark up the account. They don't have to worry about, you know, how are they going to get the points? Right? They're not they'll have to worry about running out of points to assign. Right? And I just that analogy really, really resonated with me. And I've tried to take it a step further, essentially. So So I went to University of Virginia Riddick, I know you went to Duke. So let's just let's just use a an analogy real quick. And I played lacrosse in college. So let's, so let's just play with that for a moment. So in in, in lacrosse, you score a goal, you're assigned one point. So let's just assume for a moment that that Virginia beats do let's call it 12 Eight, okay. Okay. With it right. 12 goals. It goes found scores 12 Eight. So the total surplus of points in that scenario is 20. Right? Right. It's also true that the scorekeeper runs a 20 point deficit, right? Okay, I'm listening. So if if the rules makers decided that they wanted to, you know, instead of a goal being worth one point, let's say it's worth two points, just universal across the board, it's worth two points. In that situation, the the final score of that same game is going to be 20, for the 16th. Right. And so that's a total deficit of a 40 points run by the scorekeeper. And what I would point out is that it's not the deficit, it's like the deficit doubled in that instance. But it's not the deficit that caused the inflation of the points, right, it was the change in the rules. And so when we think about, you know, the, you know, the government as the as the source of, you know, absolute prices in the economy, and that's, that's literally true. So when we had the big fiscal stimulus in, you know, 2020 2021, that's sort of like saying, you know, we wrote into law that like it, you know, it was easier or cheaper, quote, unquote, for a certain, you know, cohort of the population to accumulate US government tax credits. And, and in that way, it was sort of like inflation by policy decree. And the higher deficits that, you know, were recorded, or during that period, are the result of that sort of inflationary policy. And so it's the, it's the rules, the laws that themselves the that, that adjust prices, and the deficit, and the money balances are the effects rather than the cause. You know, kind of similar to if you think about, okay, US government is refilling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, right? So if we pay, you know,$70 a barrel for a barrel of oil, one month, and then the next month paid $90 per barrel of oil? Well, they've, the government has effectively said that $1 is worth that $1, that a month ago was worth 1/78 of a barrel of oil is now worth 190 of a barrel of oil. And so that and, and that results in higher money balances flowing to, you know, the, the oil seller's bank account. And so that's sort of I to me, like, that's a that's been a useful way of thinking about, like deficits and inflation and sort of that, that sort of link does that. What do we think about that? I think

Ritik Goyal: 1:03:23

I'm intrigued, I think that's interesting. I've definitely thought about the idea of like, they wouldn't go back to the, to the analogy of, of the score when the score doubles, like, like Duke lost by the same amount in like functional terms, even though the like the deficit that dewclaws buys is more, I've definitely thought about that in terms of interest rates, where, and I guess that that makes sense, because like Mosler talks a lot about, like the term structure of prices being interest rates, and then those are set by the government, where like, when interest rates rise, like, we live in a circular system where, you know, we're all paying an interest rate, and we're all receiving an interest rate. So if interest rates rise, then it's a it's functionally like a stock split, where it's like, in terms of like, the, the literal, like, amount of things that you own, like, yeah, it's gone up or it's gone down. But functionally, you know, if if I'm, if I'm borrowing a 2%, and I and I earn 1%, on on my assets, and now I'm borrowing with 6%. And I earn 5%. Like, nothing has changed, interest rates have gone up a lot, but like, for my intents and purposes, it's all the same. So and that's, I think that's why like the Fed's policy tools are so basically broken, where they're changing the amount that we're paying each other, they're changing the amount that we're paying, and we're earning at the same time. It's not like when the Fed raises rates, like, we have to pay a tax to like the Feds black box that like that money can never be retrieved and that tax, they've increased. No, they've paid they've raised the amount that like we're going to pay somebody else that's also in the economy and is also participating, which is why like, I think the linkages for for monetary policy are so kind of opaque, but in terms of in terms of prices, and in terms of the federal government setting prices with like the petroleum reserves example that's that's interesting, too. I haven't really thought about it like that.

Ryan Benincasa: 1:05:10

I think I think Douglas has said before, you know, the Fed raises rates Well Fed raised rates, it's essentially raising prices and then supplying the income that supports those higher prices. Well, yeah, great way to put it.

Unknown: 1:05:27

Rick, thanks for coming on, man. I know. Yeah, I wish we had more time. This is, this is great. I again, I love being able to pick someone's brain who's come to very similar conclusions, and not exactly the exact same path that, that we've made it. And I really appreciate, I really appreciate your insights. And I wish you the best of luck with with your projects. Thanks.

Ritik Goyal: 1:05:47

Yeah. And I just want to just want to echo that I really liked the work that all of y'all are doing. I think you all have a have an obligation almost to to spread the gospel of MMT. And, and I, you know, wish you luck on that project. So I think it's important, but thanks for having me. Yeah,

Adam Rice: 1:06:04

thank you, Rick, do you want to where can people find you online?

Ritik Goyal: 1:06:08

I'm on Twitter. You can follow me at at RP Goyle. Underscore, to RPG Oh, ye l underscore and then the video the Fed does not exist is linked on on my like, pin to my profile, so you can grab it there.

Adam Rice: 1:06:24

Awesome. And I'll make sure to put that in the show notes as well. But yeah, thank you. Thank you, Tom for your time, man. Great speaking with you, Ryan. I don't know if there's anything you want to close out with. No,

Ryan Benincasa: 1:06:35

no, this was this was so fun. Thanks for coming on, Rick. Yeah,

Ritik Goyal: 1:06:38

for sure. And yeah, again, Thanks for Thanks for having me.